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ON THE FACT THAT THE ASSASSINATION WAS NOT CARRIED OUT IN THE MANNER
IN WHICH SUCH TERRORIST ACTS ARE USUALLY EXECUTED BY ARGENTINE
GROUPS. IN ADDITION, NO GROUP HAS TAKEN CREDIT FOR THE ASSASSINATION,
WHICH IS UNLIKE ARGENTINE EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS, AND PRATS HAD
NO IMPORTANCE ON THE ARGENTINE POLITICAL SCENE.


THERE WAS NO CONSENSUS AMONG OFFICIAL ARGENTINE
GOVERNMENT CIRCLES REGARDING WHETHER THE ASSASSINATION WAS THE WORK
OF A CHILEAN LEFT-WING OR RIGHT-WING GROUP.)

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
GENERAL PRATS IN LATE SEPTEMBER AND THAT PRATS HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A PHONE CALL FROM A CHILEAN ATTEMPTING TO ASSUME AN ARGENTINE ACCENT. THE CALLER WARNED PRATS THAT A TEAM WAS PREPARING TO ASSASSINATE HIM, THE CALLER ADDING THAT HE OPPOSED THE ASSASSINATION. ACCORDING TO PRATS, THE CALLER SUGGESTED THAT PRATS HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE TO ANNOUNCE THIS THREAT, EXPLAINING THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE TEAM TO CANCEL THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT. 5 THE CALLER ALSO SUGGESTED THAT PRATS SHOULD CARRY OUT HIS PLANNED TRIP 3 TO BRAZIL. PRATS TOLD THAT HE HAD NOT CONTEMPLATED SUCH

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A TRIP BUT THAT HE HAD USED ALLEGED TRAVEL TO BRAZIL AS A PRETEXT WITH CHILEAN CONSUL GENERAL ALVARO DROGUETT TO OBTAIN A PASSPORT.

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5.

INSISTS THAT PRATS WAS NOT POLITICALLY ACTIVE IN BUENOS AIRES.
HOWEVER, PRATS HAD NEARLY COMPLETED HIS MEMOIRS WHICH STRONGLY
CONDEMNED MANY NON-POPULAR UNITY POLITICIANS AND MILITARY OFFICERS.
AFTER PRATS' ASSASSINATION, HIS DAUGHTER TOOK THE MANUSCRIPT OF
THE MEMOIRS BACK TO SANTIAGO.

1.5 (C)

6.

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